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Politics and economics are closely intertwined. Scholars have written hundreds of articles 
about the political consequences of macroeconomic conditions, including studies of election 
outcomes (Fiorina 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), macropartisanship (Lockerbie 1989; 
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989), and presidential approval (Kernell 1978; MacKuen et al. 
1989). It is clear that the economy, both directly and indirectly, has a major impact on political 
attitudes and behaviors.  
Much of the literature has assumed this relationship to be one-directional, with economic 
conditions leading to political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Kiewiet 1983; MacKuen, Erikson, and 
Stimson 1992). We suggest, however, that this assumption is theoretically and empirically 
unjustified: in much the same way that political behaviors (e.g., voting) are influenced by 
economic perceptions, citizens’ economic behaviors are also affected by political attitudes. In 
particular, we find that increasing approval of the president leads to increased spending in the 
aggregate, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy for the electorate. At the same time, this increased 
approval generates greater volatility in spending, a natural function of the increased role 
motivation plays in spending decisions as mean levels of income (i.e. ability) increase.  
While previous research has shown that political evaluations can affect economic 
perceptions (e.g., De Beof and Kellstedt 2004), the present analysis contributes to a growing 
body of evidence demonstrating a direct link to economic behavior at both the individual (Enns 
and Anderson 2009; Gerber and Huber 2010) and aggregate (Gerber and Huber 2009) levels. 
Economic evaluations are an important component, but they do not tell the whole story: political 
optimism affects both economic attitudes and behaviors. This type of emotional carry-over effect 
is common in political and other contexts, and we argue that the political economy is no 
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exception. After all, “voters and consumers are essentially the same people. Mr. Smith buys and 
votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and the voting booth” (Tullock 1976). 
The present analysis begins by outlining the relationship between economic and political 
indicators, focusing on recent work that demonstrates how political attitudes influence economic 
behavior. In doing so, we highlight existing explanations for this link, while offering up our own 
theoretical approach at the micro-level (i.e., carry-over effects) for observing such a relationship 
in the aggregate. Employing monthly time series data from 1978 to 2008, our analyses expand 
upon this nascent body of work by using measures more directly tied to the constructs of interest 
to examine the complex relationships between subjective and objective economic indicators, 
political attitudes, and the media. Our theoretical model also lends itself to a system of equations, 
enabling us to address questions of causality and endogeneity. The results have a number of 
implications, not least of which is that the picture painted of the political economy by prior 
studies is incomplete. More concretely, this effect provides presidents with a more pliable 
method of manipulating the economy – indirectly through approval rather than directly through 
economic policies. 
The Political Determinants of Mean Consumer Spending 
While the literature on political outcomes has consistently demonstrated the importance 
of the economy (Fiorina 1978; Kernell 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lockerbie 1989; 
MacKuen et al. 1989), the economic literature, in stark contrast, has generally ignored political 
attitudes and behaviors. A prototypical example comes from Ludvigson (2004), who forecasted 
changes in consumer spending using only lags of consumer sentiment. Other studies have 
incorporated borrowing and taxation rates as well as other forms of financial innovation while 
omitting political factors (e.g., Blinder 1981; Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2006). Indeed, when 
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politics have been explicitly considered in analyses of consumer behavior it is typically limited 
to major shocks (e.g., the Gulf War, 9/11) that are included to absorb variance in the series, not 
as variables of interest in and of themselves (e.g., Garner 1991). 
This oversight is likely due to the assumption that the relationship between politics and 
economics is a one-way street, with economic attitudes influencing political behavior, but not the 
other way around. Yet many politicians speak as if the reverse were true, implying a very 
different causal relationship in their communications and campaign messages. For example, 
President Carter’s infamous “malaise” speech argued that the root of the economic downturn and 
gas shortages was a “crisis of confidence” in America that, if restored, would set the country on a 
positive economic trajectory once more. Reagan’s “Morning in America” ad also played on this 
theme, arguing that the country was “prouder and stronger and better” under Reagan’s 
leadership, resulting in lower unemployment, interest rates, and inflation. In the extreme, the 16-
day government shutdown in October of 2013 was blamed for reducing holiday spending and 
slowing the economic recovery. A survey conducted during this time revealed that citizens 
agreed with such rhetoric: roughly 40% of Americans reported cutting back on their spending as 
a result of lowered confidence in the political system (Chung 2013). 
From a theoretical standpoint, political optimism might only affect economic behavior 
through expectations: citizens first become more optimistic or pessimistic about the economy in 
reaction to a change in partisan control in Washington; they then behave according to these 
updated expectations by increasing or decreasing their spending, in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This theoretical perspective has been put forth by Gerber and Huber (2010), particularly in the 
context of elections. Partisans “believe that their party is of better quality, and when their party 
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wins an election [they] become more optimistic about the economy and alter their consumption 
decisions and personal happiness in response to that expected improvement” (p. 168). 
There is certainly empirical support for the idea that political attitudes affect economic 
behavior indirectly through economic attitudes. Most prominently, De Boef and Kellstedt (2004) 
have demonstrated that increasing presidential approval leads to more optimistic economic 
attitudes. These findings are echoed in Ladner and Wlezien (2007), who found that the expected 
electoral success of one’s party colors prospective economic evaluations (see also Evans and 
Pickup 2010). In turn, a large literature demonstrates that consumer sentiment shapes economic 
behavior, including consumer spending. While we are not aware of any studies examining this 
causal chain in its entirety, there is convincing evidence that at least some of the relationship 
between presidential approval and economic behavior is mediated by economic attitudes. 
Yet standard measures of economic perceptions and consumer confidence comprise only 
part of what determines actual spending (Katona 1968). According to one analysis, the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment (ICS) explained only 14% of changes in actual consumer spending between 
1954 and 1993 (Carroll et al. 1994). Ludvigson (2004) similarly notes that aggregate consumer 
confidence is a good indicator of present economic conditions, but does not provide much 
predictive value beyond standard economic indicators (see also Kellstedt, Linn, and Hannah 
2015). In other words, a great deal of variance in consumer behavior is left unexplained by 
economic perceptions. 
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One reason for this discrepancy is that spending is a function of ability and motivation, 
whereas the ICS tends to emphasize only the former.1 Furthermore, scholars have recently 
proposed that political attitudes can directly account for some of this variance. Enns and 
Anderson (2009), for example, argue that political attitudes directly impact economic behavior 
because people seek to be consistent in their attitudes and behaviors. In other words, individuals 
tailor their behavior – economic or otherwise – to their attitudes in order to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. Using consumer survey data collected during the 2000 presidential election, they 
found that respondents’ partisanship predicted spending, with “winning” partisans increasing and 
“losing” partisans decreasing spending, an effect driven entirely by voting citizens. 
A direct relationship between political attitudes and economic behavior has also been 
demonstrated at the aggregate level, with sales increasing in counties more heavily populated by 
partisans of the winning party over the course of elections (Gerber and Huber 2009). Because 
this boost in consumer spending appears shortly before the election, “citizens appear to be 
adjusting their consumption based on expected income rather than today’s income” (p. 424). 
This adds credence to the notion that while consumer sentiment is an excellent reflection of 
                                                 
1 Ironically, as Kellstedt, Linn, and Hannah (2015) point out, Katona argued that income and 
assets measure ability to spend and proposed the attitudinal ICS specifically as a measure of 
willingness (i.e., motivation). Yet four of the five questions focus on objective realities and 
ability (e.g., “would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were a year 
ago”); the one question closest to ascertaining motivation and willingness asks “do you think 
now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items” rather than “do you plan” or 
“are people interested in buying” these items. 
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current economic conditions, actual consumer behavior is affected by political optimism and 
pessimism. 
On a macro scale, a substantial literature in comparative politics has also demonstrated 
that political certainty and stability leads to greater economic growth, specifically by boosting 
the rate of private investment and other factors associated with economic expansion (e.g., Aisen 
and Veiga 2006; Alesina et al. 1996; Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Ozler and 
Tabellini 1991). In other words, the more confidence the electorate has in the political system, 
the better the economy. Of course, these analyses examine a much wider range of political and 
economic situations; nonetheless, we see no reason why these relationships would not hold up in 
a more nuanced fashion with a more restricted range of political confidence. 
Within the American context, we do not explicitly reject the notion of cognitive 
dissonance, however we believe it much more likely that this effect is due to optimism or 
pessimism in one domain seeping unconsciously into other domains.2 Research on decision-
making has shown that incidental (i.e., unrelated) emotions have carry-over effects that impact 
subsequent behavior, often outside of one’s awareness (e.g., Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; 
Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004). For example, consumer researchers have found that 
relative to a neutral baseline, sad individuals demanded higher prices in exchange for a good but 
                                                 
2 Enns and Anderson (2009) examined whether mood could explain the observed changes in 
consumer behavior, and found no significant change in happiness after the election. However, 
they do not test whether happiness directly predicts spending and, in any case, the question is 
quite broad (i.e., “I’m very happy with my life as it is”) and does not speak to confidence in the 
political system. 
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were willing to sell it at a lower price. The authors suggest that this means events such as 9/11 
“could actually encourage rather than discourage consumer spending” (Lerner, Small, and 
Loewenstein 2004: 340). Other research has also found that sad individuals are willing to spend 
more on a purchase than neutral ones (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl 2008). This relationship 
was moderated by a general orientation toward money: sad consumers who were “spendthrifts” 
spent more while “tightwads” spent less (Rick, Cryder, and Lowenstein 2007), with the latter 
outnumbering the former 2 to 1. 
At a glance such findings appear counter to our argument, but there are two critical issues 
to consider. First, while happiness and enthusiasm are the opposite valence of sadness, this does 
not mean that they would have the opposite impact on consumer spending. Indeed, much of the 
research on incidental emotions has been conducted in the context of appraisal theories, which 
hold that emotions of the same valence (e.g., anxiety and anger) have different effects on 
behavior, while emotions with different valences can lead to similar behaviors (e.g., Han, Lerner, 
and Keltner 2007). Second, sadness is a relatively uncommon emotional reaction in American 
politics. Not surprisingly, most of the research on appraisal theories of emotions in a political 
context has focused on fear, anger, and/or enthusiasm. Regardless, we believe that a drop in 
presidential approval does not indicate sadness so much as it does disappointment in and/or 
anger with the political system. 
We are unaware of any publicly available research that has examined the impact of 
happiness or enthusiasm on spending decisions (as opposed to how spending impacts happiness, 
on which there are many interesting published studies). There is, however, some survey and 
experimental evidence demonstrating that enthusiasm affects domain-specific behaviors, such as 
political participation (Brader 2005; Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Certainly happiness appears to 
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increase heuristic thinking and “shallow” thought processing (Brader 2005), and positive 
emotions generally are affiliated with approach behaviors (Marcus and MacKuen 1993). 
As a result, we expect increases in political satisfaction to be associated with increases in 
consumer spending. Moreover, we hold that an electorate confident in the direction of the 
country should engage in greater spending as a matter of course, rather than consciously and 
explicitly aligning economic decisions with political attitudes as a form of coping with cognitive 
dissonance. Given that experiments have typically found subjects to be unaware of the fact that 
incidental emotions affected their behavior, we believe that this process plays out on a similarly 
unconscious and implicit level outside the lab. 
Of course, our times series data cannot test whether consumer spending is affected by 
approval consciously or unconsciously. Nonetheless, this theory generates expectations in the 
aggregate, ones that we seek to observe while simultaneously addressing some weaknesses of 
prior research. For one, the survey data employed by Enns and Anderson asked about specific 
categories of consumption that, while important indicators of spending (i.e., food, transportation, 
and entertainment), comprise only a quarter of total expenditures. Other studies demonstrating 
that political attitudes affect economic behavior have employed measures of intended – but not 
actual – holiday and vacation spending (Gerber and Huber 2010). At the aggregate level, Gerber 
and Huber (2009) used county-level taxable sales that, while exhibiting “no apparent geographic 
or attrition bias” (p. 412), covered slightly more than half the states, and likely contained some 
measurement error due to cross-county/state purchases and the reporting of sales – though, as 
they note, such error would serve to attenuate any results. Regardless, it is clear that employing a 
more complete and direct measure of consumer spending would serve to bolster these findings 
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and provide greater confidence in the idea that political attitudes and economic behavior are 
directly linked. 
Similarly, previous analyses have focused exclusively on partisanship (Enns and 
Anderson 2009; Gerber and Huber 2010) or proxies of partisanship (Gerber and Huber 2009) as 
a measure of political attitudes. Although informed by partisanship, the theoretical concept of 
interest is approval of and satisfaction with the government. Theoretically, partisanship is 
relatively stable (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and more indicative of one’s identity 
(e.g., Greene 2004) than satisfaction with the present political system. Empirically, satisfaction 
with the government varies over time in response to political events and the public’s approval of 
political actors involved in these events. As a result, we employ presidential approval as our key 
independent variable, given that it is more closely linked with the theoretical concept of interest.  
Beyond the Mean: Incorporating Volatility into Models of Economic Behavior 
Our focus on trends rather than cross-sectional data not only allows us to analyze shifts in 
the public’s attitudes and spending over time, but also enables us to consider the volatility of 
these trends. Robert Engle acknowledged in his 2003 Nobel lecture that political factors such as 
elections and wars can affect the volatility in financial markets (see also Canes-Wrone and Park 
2012). Yet while a number of studies have examined the causes of volatility in economic 
variables, these analyses have, much like the macroeconomic literature generally, ignored the 
potential impact of politics (e.g., Christiansen et al. 2012; Dhawan and Jeske 2006). 
When it comes to predicting the volatility of consumer spending specifically, the 
literature is fairly thin. On one hand, some scholars have found that greater political instability – 
as defined by changes in control of executive power in a country – is associated with higher 
volatility in inflation (Aisen and Vega 2006). Others who have examined how mean levels of 
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political variables affect economic volatility, however, have found that higher levels of 
democracy are associated with lower volatility in GDP (Mobarak 2005). Moreover, how these 
results relate to our research questions is not entirely clear, as these studies employ neither 
presidential approval nor consumer spending in their models. 
At the same time, analyses that examine mean levels of political attitudes as a function of 
economic volatility have generally found a positive relationship between the two. In particular, 
these studies reveal that increasing volatility in the stock market is associated with increased 
presidential approval (Schwartz, Hoover, and Schwartz 2008; Chong, Halcoussis, and Phillips 
2011). The “basic idea is simply that in times of uncertainty, people act to support the President,” 
akin to a rally round the flag effect (Schwartz et al. 2008, 200). Similarly, Chong and colleagues 
note that while “it is intuitive to assume that a decrease in market volatility will result in a higher 
approval, we notice that it is during times of economic uncertainty… when the market is looking 
toward the president for leadership, that we witness a positive causal relationship” (2011, 394). 
Closely related work finds a similar association, with worsening mean levels of economic 
conditions leading to decreases in the volatility of presidential approval (Gronke and Brehm 
2002; although see Kriner and Schwartz 2009). In other words, negative economic conditions 
appear to stabilize political opinions, while positive economic events lend themselves to greater 
unpredictability in the electorate. 
Based on this work we expect a similar relationship, albeit in the reverse causal direction: 
whereas low presidential approval simultaneously dampens consumer spending and decreases 
the volatility of spending, high levels of approval should not only lend itself to increased 
spending, but also greater volatility in that spending. Rather than a rally round the flag effect, 
however, we suggest that volatility is positively associated with presidential approval for more 
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practical reasons. In particular, if presidential approval increases the level of spending, then it 
will also inherently increase the variance in spending. The lower spending is, the more ability 
plays a role in spending and the less motivation or willingness matters. Conversely, as sentiment 
(i.e., ability) and thus spending increases, motivation comes to play a more important role, 
motivation that varies across people and over time. 
Theoretical Expectations 
Given the complex nature of the political economy, Figure 1 summarizes the 
hypothesized relationships between the political and economic attitudes and behaviors in the 
model.3 First, a large literature has demonstrated that objective economic indicators (Fiorina 
1981; Kernell 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979) and subjective economic evaluations (De Boef 
and Kellstedt 2004; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; MacKuen et al. 1992) affect political 
evaluations. Similarly, the chief factors in modern time series models of consumer spending are 
objective economic indicators (Carroll 1992; Poterba and Samick 1995; Romer 1990). The 
effects are similar to those found in approval models, with consumer spending increasing as the 
economy improves and declining as economic conditions worsen. 
-- Figure 1 About Here -- 
Beyond the impact of objective economic indicators, it is clear that economic behavior is 
also affected by subjective economic evaluations (Carroll et al. 1994; Gelper et al. 2007; 
Ludvigson 2004; Starr 2008). We suggest that when political confidence is high, as measured by 
                                                 
3 The complexity of the relationships described in Figure 1 also raise concerns about 
endogeneity, a question we address in a later section. 
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high presidential approval ratings, consumer spending will also increase; conversely, low 
presidential ratings should depress consumer spending (H1). 
In addition to impacting changes in average consumer behavior, we anticipate that 
presidential approval will also affect the volatility in consumer behavior. Previous work has 
found that increased economic volatility is associated with increased presidential approval, 
though it has focused on approval as the dependent variable. Thus, as the mean level of 
presidential approval increases, volatility in consumer spending should also increase (H2). 
Data and Methods 
The analyses that follow explore whether political attitudes and the stability of these 
attitudes directly impact the economy using monthly data that spans from January of 1978 
through December of 2008. In operationalizing the macroeconomy, we follow the mainstream 
economic literature by measuring our dependent variable in terms of personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE).4 PCE include all household purchases of goods and services made by 
residents in the U.S. In turn, expenditures comprise approximately two-thirds of the country’s 
domestic spending and “are by far the most important single item of aggregate demand” 
(Vuchelen 2004: 494). As such, PCE are the engine of economic growth and play a vital role in 
affecting both the unemployment and inflation rates, among other indictors of economic health. 
                                                 
4 The data on total personal consumption expenditures were gathered from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ “National Income and Product Accounts” (2009), publicly available online 
at http://www.bea.gov/national/. Measured in billions of dollars and seasonally adjusted, the data 
have also been adjusted for inflation to constant 2008 dollars.  
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As shown in the first panel of Figure 2, expenditures have experienced relatively steady 
growth during the period of examination; however, the short-term changes in PCE are difficult to 
see. Thus, the second panel presents PCE after it has been differenced, highlighting the median 
monthly change of over 13 billion dollars.  
-- Figure 2 About Here -- 
To measure our key independent variable, presidential approval, we use the percentage 
of respondents according to Gallup Polls who approve of the president’s handling of his job each 
month. Subjective economic evaluations are measured using the University of Michigan’s 
Survey of Consumers Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS). Although recent research suggests 
that the individual components may be better predictors of consumer spending than the index as 
a whole, indices are also more reliable than individual survey questions (Kellstedt et al. 2015).5 
We measure the objective economy by including those factors commonly used in models of 
consumer spending, such as inflation and unemployment rates, along with real disposable income 
(RDI), and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). 
                                                 
5 We nonetheless re-ran the model with the two business conditions questions (e.g., Kellstedt et 
al. 2015) and personal prospections (see fn. 1) one at a time in lieu of the index. The components 
exhibited unique relationships with spending, but in each case the results of interest were 
substantively and statistically unaffected. We thus use the index; results using the components 
are available from the authors upon request.  
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In addition, we include political and economic events as interventions to explain shocks 
to the series not accounted for by other variables in the model.6 Similarly, the model includes 
variables indicating the first two months of a new presidential administration, the honeymoon 
period, and elections. Finally, a voluminous literature shows that the media play a central role in 
both economic perceptions (e.g., Soroka, Stecula, and Wlezien 2015; De Boef and Kellstedt 
2004) and presidential approval (e.g., Brody 1991; Nadeau et al. 1999). As a result, we control 
for media sentiment toward the president, as measured by separate counts of positive and 
negative mentions in The New York Times. The data were coded for sentiment using the Lydia 
system.7 
                                                 
6 These interventions were identified by examining the ARFIMA residuals. Only the most 
extreme events were included to avoid overfitting. 
7 This system has been used by other scholars and institutions as an indicator of media sentiment. 
Most prominently, beginning in the fall of 2007, the Annenberg National Election Study 
included daily summary data generated by Lydia to capture information about each presidential 
candidate and relevant issues, providing a snapshot of the campaign for the day respondents 
completed the survey. Studies of the system’s internal validity can be found in a variety of 
sources. An overview of the technical aspects of the process can be found in Bautin, Ward, Patil, 
and Skiena (2010). For details about the aggregation process, see Bautin, Ward, and Skiena 
(2009). For a discussion of the sentiment analysis, see Bautin, Vijayarenu, and Skiena (2008) and 
Godbole et al. (2007). A technical discussion of the spatial analysis can be found in Bautin et al. 
(2010). Readers may also see Online Appendix A for a general discussion of the Lydia system.  
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All variables were differenced by their respective values of d to create stationary series 
(Granger 1980).8 An attempt to specify lag structure using statistical significance to eliminate 
insignificant lags runs the danger of curve-fitting.9 Rather than rely on post hoc decisions, lag 
lengths were chosen by examining the log-likelihood and AIC for a variety of specifications. 
Based on these results, contemporaneous effects were included for all variables, and two-month 
lags were included for all political, economic, and media variables.10 
Traditional autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average techniques explore 
only the first moment of a series, yet we are also interested in the stability of expenditures. 
Because Engle’s LM test indicates the presence heteroskedastic errors, also known as an 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) process, a multivariate ARCH-M 
                                                 
The media coverage variables also act as micro-event detectors, picking up events – 
political and otherwise – that relate to the president. This allows us to include changes in the 
political environment in a more parsimonious fashion, reducing the number of interventions in an 
already complex model. 
8 See Online Appendix B for integration tests and the values of d used to difference each series. 
9 Likewise, specifying the lag structure a priori requires assumptions about the behavior of the 
political and economic variables that are difficult to justify theoretically. 
10 Multicollinearity is certainly a concern for time series data, as variables may share a common 
trend over time. Although this is true when variables are included as regressors in their level 
form, differencing the data removes any time trend, thus limiting the correlation between 
variables (Gujarati 2004, 367).  
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specification was used to estimate the model.11 The ARCH-M specification allows conditional 
volatility to affect the mean of expenditures (Engle, Lilien, and Robins 1987). To account for the 
long-term equilibrium relationship between disposable income, subjective economic evaluations, 
and consumption, a fractional error correction mechanism (FECM) is included (Grant and Lebo 
2016; Lebo and Grant 2016).12 The ARCH-M model includes equations for the mean, or amount 
of spending, as well as the conditional volatility. We first discuss the results of the mean 
equation, followed by the ARCH parameters and conditional volatility results. 
Mean Results 
As shown in Table 1 and in line with H1, the mean of consumer spending is significantly 
impacted by presidential approval. The relationship is substantively quite powerful: a 1% change 
in fractionally differenced approval results in a contemporaneous increase of $2.47 billion, or 
                                                 
11 The model has a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.07, indicating no significant autocorrelation 
remaining. The residuals are also white noise, with a Ljung-Box Q statistic of 14.6 at a lag of 20. 
The results for the models run using first differences instead fractional differencing techniques 
are presented in Online Appendix D. The results remain substantively unchanged. 
12 A table of cointegration tests can be found in Online Appendix C.  We follow the procedures 
discussed in Grant and Lebo (2016) and Lebo and Grant (2016) to test for cointegration. The 
fractional differencing parameter for the FECM is 0.61. Although PCE and RDI do not meet 
traditional standards of cointegration in our data, they are treated as cointegrated in the 
economics literature and are included in our FECM (e.g., Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo 
1978; Lettau and Ludvigson 2001). PCE and approval do not show evidence of cointegration 
and, as such, approval has been excluded from the FECM.  
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26.8%, of the mean monthly change in fractionally differenced expenditures. Moreover, the 
effect of increased approval persists the following month, resulting in an additional increase in 
spending. A standard deviation change in fractionally differenced approval – 4.8 points – leads to 
almost twice the mean change in fractionally differenced expenditures over two months. The 
magnitude and persistence of this effect allows political perceptions to play a large role in 
shaping economic behavior. 
-- Table 1 About Here -- 
With respect to the other political variables, we see that honeymoons have no significant 
impact on spending, while elections have a more qualified one. Consumers respond to positive 
political evaluations and elections contemporaneously, but the effect of elections does not reach 
traditional levels of significance. However, the direction of the effect conforms to previous 
research finding a positive relationship between elections and spending (Gerber and Huber 2009; 
Enns and Anderson 2009). 
With respect to objective economic indicators, rising inflation has a negative effect on 
PCE, significantly reducing expenditures over two months. This decrease in expenditures due to 
adverse economic conditions is to be expected: when goods and services cost more, consumers 
spend less. The unemployment rate, while not reaching traditional levels of significance, reduces 
expenditures in the short term, but there is no lagged effect. Similarly, as the DJIA and 
disposable income increase, PCE increases as well. That is, as the market improves and stocks 
are worth more, consumers are able to spend more, although this effect is only marginally 
significant for the stock market. Not surprisingly, changes in objective economic indicators 
account for a larger percentage of the monthly change in PCE than do the political variables. 
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Nevertheless, even when accounting for these traditional variables, presidential popularity plays 
a substantively significant role in predicting macroeconomic conditions. 
 While PCE responds to objective economic indicators, it also reacts to the non-
fundamental factors, or “animal spirits” (Keynes 1936), as reflected in the ICS. The month 
following an increase in sentiment, expenditures also increase. In line with prior research, this 
shows that consumption expenditures depend not just on the availability of money – the ability to 
spend – but also on consumers’ willingness to spend. When the economy is perceived as 
improving, expenditures increase the following month. Conversely, when the economy is 
perceived as performing poorly, even if that perception is not in line with objective economic 
indicators, consumers will be less willing to spend because they fear conditions may worsen. 
There is also a significant error correction between income, economic sentiment, and 
expenditures, indicating the three are in long-term equilibrium; 26.6% of the distance between 
the three series disappears a month after they are driven apart by an exogenous shock. 
 Interestingly, we also find that positive media sentiment contemporaneously exhibits a 
negative relationship with spending, but positively predicts increases in spending one month out. 
Similarly, negative media coverage is simultaneously associated with greater spending but leads 
to reductions in spending a month later. We suspect this may be a function of measuring 
presidential sentiment, which takes longer to filter through the system and bleed over into 
economic activity than news that is directly about the economy. However, further investigation 
of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The significant ARCH parameter shows evidence of volatility clustering, or periods of 
high volatility grouping together (Engle 2003). We have modeled the mean of expenditures as a 
function of risk using an ARCH-M specification. We would expect volatility, indicating 
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economic uncertainty, to have a negative effect on overall spending, and this is borne out in the 
data: as volatility increases, overall expenditures decrease. These results are consistent with work 
in economics showing that economic uncertainty leads citizens to tighten their belts. 
Volatility Results 
 While we explored the variables affecting how much consumers spend in the mean 
equation, those same factors can affect the stability, or volatility, of economic behavior. Turning 
now to the volatility model, and as hypothesized in H2, the relationship between approval and 
expenditure volatility is positive. Just as in the mean equation, increased approval leads to a 
contemporaneous increase in expenditures. Honeymoons also have a similar, positive 
contemporaneous effect, albeit not at traditional levels of significance. Nevertheless, when 
political evaluations are high, volatility in consumer spending increases. 
 Also aligning with the results of the mean equation, increases in inflation dampens 
volatility in expenditures. Meanwhile, consumer sentiment and disposable income, both positive 
indicators of economic health, have a positive and significant effect on volatility. Thus, as with 
mean levels of approval, the increased ability to spend enables citizens’ motivation and 
willingness to spend to play a greater role, creating greater volatility in the series. Similarly, as 
the economy shrinks and spending ability declines, so, too, do the fluctuations in spending. 
Although marginally predictive of the mean of consumption expenditures, the 
unemployment rate does not have a significant effect on volatility in expenditures. The stock 
market is a similarly insignificant predictor of expenditure volatility. By including previously 
neglected political factors, it appears that the explanatory power of objective economic 
conditions has been reduced. 
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Instability in consumption expenditures is further influenced by the tone of the media’s 
coverage of the president. As the president is portrayed more positively in one month, variance 
in PCE declines. The opposite is true of negative mentions: the more negative coverage a 
president receives, the more economic uncertainty increases. However, both are corrected by a 
significant rebound effect the following month. While these media effects account for a 
relatively small percentage of instability in PCE, they are further evidence of politics (as filtered 
through the media) affecting economic uncertainty.  
Temporal Ordering and the Problem of Endogeneity 
The theoretical model laid out in Figure 1 is not the first of the macro-political economy 
(e.g., Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993). Often such studies create large-scale models that 
address both short- and long-term effects but fail to account for endogeneity, and a similar 
criticism could be levied against the preceding analysis. For instance, one potential source of 
endogeneity is simultaneity bias due to a reciprocal relationship between presidential approval, 
consumer sentiment, and consumer spending. If the relationship is indeed reciprocal and this is 
not taken into account when estimating the model, estimates will be both biased and inefficient. 
We have theoretical reasons to expect this relationship to be unidirectional. As discussed 
previously, we view this effect as an emotional spillover in which increasingly optimistic citizens 
are also more willing to open their wallets. And while there is an intriguing string of research 
showing that behaviors can affect one’s mental state (e.g., smiling to increase feelings of 
happiness), it is clear that the standard flow of events is from attitudes and perceptions to 
behaviors – in this case, from political attitudes to economic behaviors. 
We also have statistical reasons to expect the relationship to be unidirectional. 
Specifically, we can gain purchase on the temporal ordering of events using Granger-causality 
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testing. If including past values of x improves predictions of y over those made solely based on 
past values of y, x is said to Granger-cause y. These Granger causality tests, displayed in Table 2, 
indicate that approval and consumer sentiment Granger cause changes in PCE. Based on these 
results, we feel confident changes in approval and consumer sentiment temporally precede 
changes in PCE. Likewise, we can rule out bidirectional Granger-causality.  
Although we have demonstrated that changes in these variables occur in time before 
changes in PCE, we must still explore whether a single-equation FECM modeling strategy is 
justified. In order to use a single equation when there is a cointegrating relationship, one of the 
components of the FECM must be weakly exogenous to the other (Charemza and Deadman 
1997; Erricson and Irons 1994; Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983). Table 2 shows that PCE is 
weakly exogenous to consumer sentiment, however the other component of the FECM, 
disposable income, is not weakly exogenous to PCE.  As a result we need to specify an equation 
for the marginal process of RDI that includes an FECM and estimate the equations 
simultaneously. 13 
                                                 
13 To test for weak exogeneity, models were first specified for the marginal processes (e.g. 
consumer sentiment). These models were then estimated including an error correction 
mechanism (ECM) from the PCE model. If the marginal process is weakly exogenous to PCE, 
the ECM should be statistically insignificant. The next step is to include the residuals from the 
marginal process equation (estimated without the ECM) into the PCE model. A statistically 
insignificant coefficient for the residuals fails to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity.  
Although not a component of the FECM, we included presidential approval in our weak 
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-- Table 2 About Here -- 
 In addition to the two equations we have as a result of our exogeneity testing, we also 
have two endogenous explanatory variables: presidential approval and consumer sentiment. 
Similar to the penultimate chapter of Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson’s The Macro Polity (2002), 
we create a large-scale model of the political economy that includes both short- and long-term 
effects. Unlike Erikson et al. (2002), however, all our variables are measured monthly. This 
common time interval enables us to employ the multiple equation formulation that brings us 
closer to what these authors herald as the “ideal representation” (p. 386) of the macro-political 
system. Thus, rather than resorting to simulations as they do, we model multiple equations 
simultaneously. 
 In particular, we specified equations for the marginal processes of the endogenous 
explanatory variables, with theoretically informative priors determining the inclusion or 
exclusion of variables from each equation. These equations were estimated along with equations 
for PCE and RDI in a four equation near-VAR using seemingly unrelated regression. Table 3 
presents the results from a variety of specifications of the PCE equation, including the results of 
the near-VAR.14 
-- Table 3 About Here -- 
                                                 
exogeneity testing as a robustness check of our exclusion of this variable from the FECM.  For a 
formal discussion of weak exogeneity, see Online Appendix E. 
14 The results for the models run using first differences instead fractional differencing techniques 
are presented in Online Appendix F.  
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 The results of the mean equation from Table 1 are presented in the first column of Table 
3; the second column is an FECM model of the mean of PCE. Comparing these two columns 
allows us to see the degree to which the estimates of the mean are affected by estimating the 
variance equation and allowing conditional volatility to affect the mean of spending. While 
approval remains significant in the FECM model, the magnitude of the effect is diminished and 
operates at a lag. Moving from the FECM model to the third column that contains the PCE 
results from the near-VAR estimation, we are struck again by the consistency of the findings. 
Regardless of our modeling strategy, the results suggest presidential approval has a significant 
and substantively meaningful impact on consumer spending. There are, of course, many other 
ways to model consumer spending; we have tried to balance both theoretical and empirical 
considerations in our choices, and the robustness of the results across these models gives us 
additional confidence in our findings. 
Discussion 
As an effort to stave off the impending “Great Recession,” President Bush signed into 
law the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, giving each taxpayer a rebate of up to $600. The hope 
was that the extra income would lead to increased consumer expenditures, thus jumpstarting the 
flagging economy and avoiding a prolonged recession. Bush’s concern with boosting consumer 
spending was not misplaced: consumer expenditures comprise the lion’s share of domestic 
spending, driving economic growth and ultimately affecting other objective indicators of 
macroeconomic health (Vuchelen 2004; NIPA 2009). In creating this Act, political actors – 
much like economists – were focusing on the role objective economic conditions play in 
economic behavior. But in assuming that spending is exogenous to political evaluations, both 
have overlooked the possibility that politics matter for the economic health of the country. 
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Our results indicate that economic behavior can be affected by the political system not 
only through direct measures such as the Stimulus Act, but also by boosting optimism and 
confidence in the system itself. This effect is not trivial: aggregated across the population, 
spending can increase or decrease by billions of dollars as a result of typical changes in 
presidential approval. Such results demonstrate that the economic consequences of political 
systems occur not just in extreme situations, as highlighted by research in comparative politics, 
but also in stable and enduring democracies that experience relatively minor changes in political 
attitudes. Our results also extend the nascent literature on the political determinants of spending 
by using direct measures of the concepts of interest with data spanning four decades and five 
presidential administrations. The use of direct measures and time series data gives us added 
confidence that the impact of political attitudes on economic behavior, found to exist previously 
in cross-sectional studies, is substantive and enduring.  
One implication of these results is that previous studies of approval have likely overstated 
the influence of economic conditions. Certainly there is no question that the economy, and 
perceptions of the economy, are important forces in political evaluations. Yet the economy itself 
is partially driven by confidence in the political system, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
When political times are good, happy citizens spend freely; when times are bad, citizens tighten 
their belts and hunker down. This type of spillover effect is common in our daily life, and 
spending decisions are no exception. 
Our findings also lend credence to the popular conception held by citizens and espoused 
by many politicians that the president has a great deal of power when it comes to economic 
conditions. Given the complexity of the American economy, one could easily argue that it is 
unfair or even ignorant that the economy plays such a large role in the electoral fortunes of 
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candidates. Yet here we see that citizens do not just reward and punish their representatives for 
the state of the economy, but also they respond in kind to their increasing or decreasing approval 
in the “Chief Economist.” By most accounts, the 2008 tax rebates had a modest impact on the 
economy, as many citizens opted to save it or use it to pay down debts. Our results suggest that 
this is a limited view of the tax rebates, and the economy may have benefitted more indirectly 
from increased approval of Bush as a result of the rebates than directly from the rebates 
themselves. The connection between approval and spending gives the president an important 
point of leverage, and one that would seem to be more directly and easily manipulated than 
objective economic factors. 
This study also moves beyond previous analyses focusing on mean levels of spending by 
explicitly considering volatility. We find that increased approval leads to not only increased 
spending but also increased volatility in that spending. Though counterintuitive on its face, such 
results are in line with previous research showing a positive association between political 
attitudes and economic volatility. When approval is low and citizens are saving rather than 
spending, volatility in spending must also be low: money will continue to be spent on non-
durable necessities, but motivation to spend becomes less relevant to spending decisions. As 
approval and spending increases, volatility will also increase as motivation comes to play an 
increasingly important role vis-à-vis ability. 
By the same token, our results indirectly relate to recent analyses of the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment. Research by Kellstedt et al. (2015) demonstrates that the ICS as a whole is 
a reliable measure of consumer sentiment, but in some instances will mask the impact of 
economic perceptions on spending. Their analysis reveals that prospective, sociotropic 
assessments of the economy predicts spending on durable goods, when the composite index 
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reveals no such relationship. Since many durable goods (e.g., household appliances, cars) tend to 
be large, non-essential purchases (as opposed to non-durable, essential, and comparatively cheap 
goods such as food, clothing, and gas), we expect motivation to play a critical role in such 
expenditures. Thus, if we are willing to accept that the ICS captures motivation to spend (which 
we do not, though that is a question for another day), we should not only see its components are 
stronger predictors of durable than non-durable spending, but also we should witness higher 
volatility in that spending. Our analysis, which examines spending on both type of goods 
combined, should be somewhere in the middle: motivation is an important but qualified 
moderator of spending. 
One interesting but unanswered question from this analysis is whether the effect of 
political approval on spending is asymmetrically impacted by partisanship. Previous research has 
demonstrated that not all citizens respond equivalently: for example, survey data regarding the 
impact of the 2000 election on spending demonstrated that spending increases among 
Republicans and decreases among Democrats were driven entirely by voters (Enns and Anderson 
2009). It would not be surprising to see that increased approval for out-partisans increases 
spending far more than comparable increases for in-party identifiers (see, for example, Kriner 
and Schwartz 2009). Conversely, if our theory is correct, we should not see asymmetry when it 
comes to the volatility of spending: Republicans and Democrats alike should be equally affected 
by lowered approval and restricted spending. Unfortunately, while presidential approval is 
available by party identification, we are unaware of any data on consumer spending over time 
broken down by party identification, which would provide an additional test of our theory. 
Similarly, it would not be surprising to see that this effect is to some degree non-linear, 
and that approval impacts consumer spending more at some levels than others. For example, it is 
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plausible that increases in approval have a greater impact at the mid-point than at very low or 
high levels of approval, in the sense of diminishing marginal returns (or losses). Alternatively, 
perhaps the relationship between approval and spending is greater in the latter part of a 
president’s administration, when citizens’ attitudes are more crystallized. In other words, a jump 
in approval at the end of a president’s term is more “real” than one at the beginning (although see 
Gronke and Brehm 2002). Although beyond the scope of this paper, we find such questions to be 
compelling and worth pursuit. 
Moreover, as any study suffers from limitations, ours is no exception. On one hand, the 
use of aggregate time series data allows us to overcome a number of problems in answering our 
research question. While spending is, at its core, the result of individual level decisions, it is 
national PCE that creates economic movement. Moreover, individual-level data is plagued with 
problems such as response bias and measurement error, problems that are diminished when 
responses are aggregated (Kramer 1983). On the other hand, and as noted at the outset, the use of 
such data prevents a direct test of our proposed theoretical mechanism. Although individual 
analyses that find similar results assuages these concerns to a degree (Enns and Anderson 2009; 
Gerber and Huber 2010), a focused test of how economic behavior is affected by political 
evaluations would be of value. Indeed, individual-level and specifically experimental data is 
ultimately needed to convincingly demonstrate the particular spillover effect we hypothesize 
here. The theories of cognitive dissonance and emotional spill-over could be tested against one 
another by manipulating dissonance or affect and measuring willingness to spend. 
Moreover, the data were initially collected in the middle of President Obama’s first term, 
thus why the series end in 2008. Given the events that happened near the end of these series and 
shortly thereafter, one might wonder how well the results hold up when there are greater shocks 
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to the system than what we observe here. Indeed, whether the relationship between approval and 
consumer spending is stronger or weaker in times of severe recession would be an interesting 
finding either way. We leave this important and interesting question for another day. 
Regardless of the theoretical mechanism, it is increasingly clear that politics is not simply 
affected by economics, but also influences it, as well. Incorporating political variables can 
sharpen forecasts of economic behavior and highlight the important role political attitudes play 
in determining economic outcomes. This perspective also helps to explain how the president 
might impact the economy beyond direct measures, and provides evidence of carryover effects 
on a large scale. As we stated at the outset: politics and economics are closely connected; our 
results contribute to a growing body of work showing this to be even more the case than 
previously thought. 
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Table 1: Model of Monthly Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1978-2008 
 Mean Equation Coefficient (Std. Error) p-value 
Political    
Approval 2.470* (0.695) 0.000 
Approvalt-1 1.243* (0.619) 0.023 
Approvalt-2 -0.584 (0.451) 0.098 
Honeymoon 34.845 (48.460) 0.236 
Honeymoon t-1 -5.408 (30.205) 0.429 
Honeymoon t-2 -19.357 (47.348) 0.342 
Election 27.315 (21.414) 0.101 
Election t-1 -16.112 (32.671) 0.311 
Election t-2 12.680 (22.137) 0.284 
Economic    
Inflation -17.253* (7.520) 0.011 
Inflationt-1 -27.187* (7.418) 0.000 
Inflationt-2 -11.909 (9.848) 0.114 
Unemployment  -23.799 (16.858) 0.079 
Unemployment t-1 -7.644 (20.303) 0.354 
Unemploymentt-2 -17.569 (17.548) 0.159 
ICS  -0.744 (0.740) 0.158 
ICS t-1 1.571* (0.858) 0.034 
ICS t-2 -0.948 (0.707) 0.090 
Dow Jones    0.006 (0.009) 0.271 
Dow Jones t-1 0.014 (0.010) 0.078 
Dow Jones t-2 -0.011 (0.012) 0.163 
Real Disp. Income 0.267* (0.050) 0.000 
Real Disp. Incomet-1 -0.255* (0.063) 0.000 
Real Disp. Incomet-2 -0.088* (0.050) 0.040 
Media & Other Events    
Positive Sentiment -0.232* (0.072) 0.001 
Positive Sentiment t-1 0.138* (0.061) 0.012 
Positive Sentiment t-2 -0.015 (0.048) 0.380 
Negative Sentiment 0.211* (0.077) 0.004 
Negative Sentiment t-1 -0.128* (0.065) 0.025 
Negative Sentiment t-2 -0.069 (0.048) 0.075 
DJIA Crosses 2000 119.615* (23.439) 0.000 
September 11th -191.510* (30.128) 0.000 
FECM -0.266* (0.046) 0.000 
Constant 70.252* (19.322) 0.000 
Volatility Equation    
Political    
Approval 0.050* (0.015) 0.001 
Approvalt-1 0.014 (0.015) 0.177 
Approvalt-2 -0.009 (0.009) 0.169 
Honeymoon 1.302 (0.834) 0.060 
Honeymoon t-1 -0.103 (0.446) 0.408 
Honeymoon t-2 -0.607 (1.079) 0.287 
Election 0.619 (0.498) 0.107 
Election t-1 -0.244 (0.833) 0.385 
Election t-2 0.325 (0.595) 0.293 
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Economic    
Inflation 0.045 (0.156) 0.386 
Inflationt-1 -0.364* (0.162) 0.013 
Inflationt-2 -0.239 (0.197) 0.113 
Unemployment  -0.242 (0.398) 0.272 
Unemployment t-1 0.019 (0.430) 0.482 
Unemploymentt-2 -0.143 (0.423) 0.368 
ICS  -0.015 (0.019) 0.212 
ICS t-1 0.039* (0.020) 0.024 
ICS t-2 -0.010 (0.016) 0.273 
Dow Jones    0.000 (0.000) 0.266 
Dow Jones t-1 0.000 (0.000) 0.321 
Dow Jones t-2 -0.000 (0.000) 0.057 
Real Disp. Income 0.004* (0.001) 0.001 
Real Disp. Incomet-1 -0.002 (0.001) 0.058 
Real Disp. Incomet-2 -0.003* (0.001) 0.002 
Media     
Positive Sentiment -0.006* (0.001) 0.000 
Positive Sentiment t-1 0.003* (0.001) 0.003 
Positive Sentiment t-2 -0.002 (0.001) 0.073 
Negative Sentiment 0.006* (0.002) 0.001 
Negative Sentiment t-1 -0.003* (0.001) 0.011 
Negative Sentiment t-2 -0.001 (0.001) 0.248 
Constant 6.299* (0.125) 0.000 
ARCH 0.073* (0.034) 0.016 
ARCH-in-Mean -0.082* (0.033) 0.007 
Durbin Watson = 2.07 N = 369   
* p  ≤ 0.05 (All tests one-tailed)      
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Table 2: Granger Causality and Weak Exogeneity Tests 
Granger Causality F-test p-value 
Approval  PCE 3.14 0.01 
Consumer Sentiment  PCE 3.17 0.01 
PCE  Approval 0.25 0.91 
PCE  Consumer Sentiment 2.09 0.08 
Weak Exogeneity* ECM Residuals 
Approval weakly exog. to PCE -0.001 (0.80) 0.25 (0.74) 
Consumer Sentiment weakly exog. to PCE 0.001 (0.44) -1.58 (0.08) 
Consumer Sentiment weakly exog. to Disposable Income 0.000 (0.79) 0.37 (0.83) 
Disposable Income weakly exog. to PCE 0.072 (0.25) -0.28 (0.04) 
*T-test (p-value), two tailed. 
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Table 3: Specifications of the Mean of Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1978-2008 
  ARCH-M FECM Near-VAR 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
  (Std. Err.)   (Std. Err.)   (Std. Err.)   
Political       
Approval 2.470* 0.000 0.092 0.390 0.009 0.489 
 (0.695)  (0.330)  (0.314)  
Approvalt-1 1.243* 0.023 0.606* 0.037 0.582* 0.035 
 (0.619)  (0.337)  (0.321)  
Approvalt-2 -0.584 0.098 -0.265 0.212 -0.256 0.208 
 (0.451)  (0.331)  (0.315)  
Honeymoon 34.845 0.236 0.456 0.486 0.473 0.485 
 (48.460)  (12.837)  (12.226)  
Honeymoon t-1 -5.408 0.429 -11.426 0.154 -11.065 0.150 
 (30.205)  (11.173)  (10.644)  
Honeymoon t-2 -19.357 0.342 -0.563 0.482 -0.007 0.500 
 (47.348)  (12.111)  (11.526)  
Election 27.315 0.101 3.139 0.371 3.018 0.370 
 (21.414)  (9.532)  (9.073)  
Election t-1 -16.112 0.311 -6.394 0.292 -6.945 0.266 
 (32.671)  (11.668)  (11.106)  
Election t-2 12.680 0.284 2.426 0.413 2.492 0.406 
 (22.137)  (10.981)  (10.450)  
Economic       
Inflation -17.253* 0.011 -18.113* 0.000 -17.475* 0.000 
 (7.520)  (4.059)  (3.866)  
Inflationt-1 -27.187* 0.000 -6.588 0.067 -5.997 0.076 
 (7.418)  (4.381)  (4.174)  
Inflationt-2 -11.909 0.114 -0.167 0.486 -0.602 0.445 
 (9.848)  (4.583)  (4.366)  
Unemployment  -23.799 0.079 -22.344* 0.011 -22.028* 0.009 
 (16.858)  (9.661)  (9.204)  
Unemployment t-1 -7.644 0.354 -22.645* 0.013 -21.359* 0.014 
 (20.303)  (10.138)  (9.658)  
Unemploymentt-2 -17.569 0.159 -11.727 0.111 -11.559 0.104 
 (17.548)  (9.592)  (9.138)  
ICS  -0.744 0.158 0.077 0.427 0.385 0.168 
 (0.740)  (0.421)  (0.400)  
ICS t-1 1.571* 0.034 0.296 0.244 0.281 0.244 
 (0.858)  (0.426)  (0.405)  
ICS t-2 -0.948 0.090 -0.268 0.256 -0.271 0.243 
 (0.707)  (0.408)  (0.389)  
Dow Jones 0.006 0.271 0.010* 0.033 0.010* 0.032 
 (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Dow Jones t-1 0.014 0.078 0.013* 0.014 0.012* 0.013 
 (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.005)  
Dow Jones t-2 -0.011 0.163 0.010* 0.041 0.010* 0.038 
 (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.005)  
Real Disp. Income 0.267* 0.000 0.126* 0.000 0.135* 0.000 
 (0.050)  (0.027)  (0.025)  
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Real Disp. Incomet-1 -0.255* 0.000 -0.188* 0.000 -0.191* 0.000 
 (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.044)  
Real Disp. Incomet-2 -0.088* 0.040 0.024 0.185 0.024 0.174 
 (0.050)  (0.027)  (0.025)  
Media & Other Events       
Positive Sentiment -0.232* 0.001 -0.011 0.346 -0.011 0.332 
 (0.072)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
Positive Sentiment t-1 0.138* 0.012 -0.007 0.398 -0.006 0.403 
 (0.061)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
Positive Sentiment t-2 -0.015 0.380 0.001 0.484 0.002 0.477 
 (0.048)  (0.027)  (0.025)  
Negative Sentiment 0.211* 0.004 -0.010 0.237 -0.010 0.380 
 (0.077)  (0.033)  (0.032)  
Negative Sentiment t-1 -0.128* 0.025 0.021 0.498 0.021 0.255 
 (0.065)  (0.033)  (0.031)  
Negative Sentiment t-2 -0.069 0.075 0.004 0.450 0.004 0.449 
 (0.048)  (0.031)  (0.030)  
DJIA Crosses 2000 119.615* 0.000 122.546* 0.000 121.737* 0.000 
 (23.439)  (21.277)  (20.246)  
September 11th -191.510* 0.000 -179.821* 0.000 -179.248* 0.000 
 (30.128)  (21.277)  (20.883)  
FECM -0.266* 0.000 -0.286* 0.000 -0.289* 0.000 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.044)  
Constant 70.252* 0.000 13.369* 0.000 12.980* 0.000 
 (19.322)              (3.099)  (2.950)  
N = 369    
*  p ≤ 0.05 (All tests one-tailed)     
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Figure 1: Theoretical Summary
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